Multinationals and the Evolution of Industrial Conflict: Bombay 1956-1984 by Banaji, Jairus & Hensman, Rohini
Focusing on Bombay, locations around Bombay and more distant labour market areas in the state and on the 
basis of a sample of about 180 plants or other establishments controlled by 125 companies belonging largely to 
the private sector, this paper elaborates an industrial relations theory of industrial conflict Conflict is seen as 
part of a bargaining process and the notion that the strike experience of individual plants is determined fun-
damentally by the industry to which they belong is rejected. Conflict is seen as belonging not to the plant itself 
but to its experience and the space described is phenomenological and not objective. Consequently there is no 
determinism which can explicate a pattern of conflict and the diversity of available choices does not bind workers 
to set responses. Likewise even if management behaviour conforms to certain determinisms even managers have 
choices. The study concentrates on plants in manufacturing sectors which may be called 'modern', that is, whose 
evolution was a product of the industrial expansion of the 1950s. 
I 
Introduction 
BOMBAY'S industrial expansion came to a 
halt in the early 70s (at least). Partly this was 
due to physical saturation—there was 
literally no room for further expansion and 
consequently strong government restrictions 
on attempts to expand even existing sites. But 
the saturation effect shows a locational stag-
gering: the industrial expansion of the new 
manufacturing sectors starts in the heart of 
the city, in spaces left vacant by the textile 
industry (Sewri, which has Lever Bros and 
Firestone by the 40s; Worli, which has Metal 
Box, Glaxo and May & Baker in this early, 
pre-expansion phase; Kurla, where Mukand 
finally settles down, close to the city's only 
car manufacturing plant, after relocating 
from 1-ahore to Batala to Reay Road!) and 
moves progressively outwards, with a main 
line of evolution which moves from 
Ghatkopar (British Oxygen has a plant here 
by the mid-50s; Wyeth starts in 1962) and 
Kanjur (Ciba-Geigy relocates here from 
lardeo in 1954)—between them lies Vikhroli 
which a local business family, the Godrejs, 
moves into and occupies during the Depres-
sion, at throwaway prices—into Bhandup 
and Mulund (early 60s) and then beyond the 
municipal limits of Greater Bombay into the 
'new industrial areas' where (at least on the 
Thane-Belapur Road) the last plants 
(Mindia, Roussel) are commissioned as 
recently as 1976. 
The evolution is continuous; every inch of 
space is occupied; the prants are lined up in 
unbroken succession. The other locations 
confirm this theory of 'phases' of evolution, 
of a movement outwards, of progressive 
saturation: Poona (now Pune) mushrooms, 
then explodes in the 60s, attracting chiefly 
engineering plants; Nasik expands in the 70s, 
through the 'related diversification' of 
Bombay companies (Crompton, Siemens, 
Glaxo, Mahindras, etc); Chandrapur's ex-
pansion, at the state's borders, is even more 
recent—by the time Larsen & Toubro starts 
a highly automated cement plant at Chan-
drapur, the company has at least 30 years 
of industrial relations experience behind it . 
When the new plants (of the late 70s/early 
80s) are commissioned, it is impossible for 
the big companies moving into new locations 
simply to forget their histories in Bombay. 
In the remote universe of these new centres 
Bombay, rationalised and forced into 
decline, will at least live as a star whose 
massive explosion occurred many years ago! 
In purely formal terms, we might distin-
guish two types of locations (in reality, of 
course, there are further types, but these are 
disregarded here): 
(i) clusters, an area of variable dimensions 
dominated by some four to five major 
plants which usually have some feature 
in common; 
(ii) line-ups. that is, linear concentrations 
along a major axis, for a stretch which 
is variable. 
Bombay's industrial landscape is character is 
ed by both sorts of locations; to be more 
precise, the physical distribution of Greater 
Bombay plants is dominated by a single-
major line-up, running from Ghatkopar to 
Mulund, along the LBS Marg, and exactly 
parallel to the more heavily used of the two 
main railway lines. This is a typical linear 
concentration which groups something in 
the order of 25 major plants (or even groups 
of plants: Godrej and Crompton are both 
large complexes). Its industrial evolution 
belongs to the phase of rapid expansion over 
1955-63, when the central government pro-
gressively modified its stand on the need for 
foreign investments, and a short (for India 
quite exceptional) period of economic 
liberalism closed markets to foreign 
exporters but opened them to investors. 
Bombay also has a whole series of clustered 
locations, but two of these are especially 
significant: Sewri (or 'Reay Road') because 
this was the location selected by the first 
wave of foreign investors, well before the 50s 
(Hindustan Lever, Firestone, Colgate, Britan-
nia) so that today it has the city's oldest 
workforces in the 'new' manufacturing sec-
tors; and, further out from the main part of 
the city, Trombay where Stanvac and 
Burmah-Shell established sprawling oil 
refineries, the city's first high-tech plants, in 
the still uncertain economic climate of the 
early 50s; with their investments it became 
possible for Union Carbide to establish a 
petrochemicals unit, with company training 
for the first batch of operators. 
Outside the municipal limits of Bombay 
but within its general labour market area, 
the Thane-Belapur Road constitutes India's 
most striking example of the line-up; a pure 
linear concentration running for some 25 
kilometres between Kalwa (the first plant 
here Indal, once Alcan-controlled, now with 
the Mahindras) and Turbhe, in relatively 
open countryside but with no signs of a 
surrounding rural life. The leading establish-
ments on the road are foreign-controlled 
(Siemens, Philips, BASF, Pfizer, etc) or 
foreign associated (Nocil wi th Shell, 
Polyolefins with Hoechst, Herdillia with 
British Petroleum), and most installations 
fairly capital-intensive. Employees' unionism 
is a sufficiently conspicuous feature of the 
area's industrial relations (Siemens Workers' 
Union, Philips Workers' Union, Pfizer 
Employees' Union, and so on) to make the 
location seem, to unions elsewhere (in 
Bombay, in older plants, etc) a prime exam-
ple of the new industrial relations culture 
fostered by some groups of employers in the 
early 70s. 
The "dispersed rural locations' are very 
different. They arc clusters but lacking any 
significant concentration, generally isolated, 
riot easily accessible, and overwhelmingly 
controlled by Indian employers. The job 
structures are far less sophisticated: 
dyestuffs, with a massive predominance of 
'unskilled' groups, is a good example of the 
sort of industry attracted by these locations. 
Distance becomes a qualitative determina-
tion: If Thane-Belapur is still part of the 
Bombay labour market area (despite the fact 
that much of the labour is recruited locally), 
Shahad or Ambarnath, clearly, are not. 
Thus locations can be distinguished ac-
cording to their type and degree of massi-
fication, of the sheer physical concentration 
or dispersal of workforces. As the analysis 
shows, this wil l turn out to have an obvious 
bearing on the pattern of conflict. What 
varies between types of locations, that is, ac-
cording to the degree of massification, is the 
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capacity of workers to sustain long strikes 
and the aggressiveness of employers in reac-
ting with lockouts. Behind these forms of 
conflict lies a whole psychology, of the per-
sistenceand depth of feeling, which is fun-
damental to all conflict, that is, any sort of 
dispute, but whose action and laws become 
manifest only in the long ones. Locations 
also differ in the sort of firms they attract: 
the presence of foreign company establish-
ments varies between areas. Foreign investors 
have a decided preference for centralised 
locations: for metropolitan or sub-metro-
politan areas with a substantial concentra-
tion of industry. The LBS Marg (in the nor-
thern suburbs of Bombay), Thane-Belapur 
Road (40 minutes to an hour from Bombay) 
and the Bombay Poona Road (which leads 
out of Pune) are locations where much of 
the industrial activity is directly due to 
foreign plants. 
How far do such plants represent a 
separate system of labour relations? How far 
does the greater progressiveness of their in-
dustrial structures reflect in more progressive 
personnel practices? Can one actually 
postulate the evolution of a managerial style 
peculiar to the sector of foreign companies, 
one which reflects a greater willingness to 
deal with unions and settle 'across the table' 
in contrast to the widespread hostility of 
Indian employers in the face of attempts to 
negotiate? The experience of companies with 
respect to industrial conflict in the individual 
establishments controlled by them is an 
obvious form in which to look for these 
answers; in other words, to test (and possibly 
discard) the hypothesis of a distinctive 
foreign sector which is discernibly pro-
gressive in its impact on labour relations. 
Since this involves comparing the experience 
of two groups of companies distinguished 
by their type of corporate control, the 
general distinction between Indian com-
panies and those which, despite Indianisa 
tion, dilution of equity, etc, remain un-
ambiguously foreign, becomes the crucial 
determination. In terms of the design of the 
sample, it determines the fact that 40 per 
cent of sample companies are foreign in the 
sense of unambiguously foreign-controlled. 
Now it is generally felt that labour is the 
last field where international control of sub-
sidiaries is at all evident That is to say, while 
international companies enforce tight finan-
cial and technical control over their Indian 
operations, they show no obvious or direct 
involvement in the labour relations of their 
subsidiaries. The implications of this we 
shall not examine here, having discussed 
them in detail elsewhere. In fact, however, 
the distinction between labour and other 
areas of business is not and could never be 
so sharply formulated. For example, if an 
international group launches a drive to in-
crease profitability worldwide, eventually 
this is bound to reflect in the day-to-day life 
of its local plants, even in something as sub-
tle as the way the union describes its 
management: a 'fair' management might be 
said to change because it is under pressure, 
internationally, to improve performance and 
starts trying to 'force things' on the union. 
The international influence may be more 
direct: the SKF plant at Chinchwad (Pune) 
is one of the very few plants anywhere in the 
country to have a full-blown pieceratc 
system; the reason is obvious, as the union 
pointed out: piecerates are SKF policy 
worldwide. The example is an important one 
because the way you design a pay structure 
will be quite central to the general style of 
labour relations in the plant. Our examples: 
most companies in the Bombay area have, 
for years, set about reducing employment 
through the more strategic means of early 
retirement schemes and non-filling of vacan-
cies; at Philips where the union decided to 
tackle this problem with the demand for an 
'Employment Strength Guarantee', a Kalwa 
manager is reported to have told them, 'We 
have a directive (from top management-
meaning the Dutch) not to fill in vacancies'. 
This is perfectly credible given the way head-
quarters of Eindhoven have handled redun-
dancies in various Philips establishments 
throughout Europe. But for plants like 
Kalwa a senior manager at Eindhoven 
disclaimed any active intervention in local 
matters. About whether central management 
in the Netherlands ever intervened in local 
disputes in third world plants, he said: 'We 
want to know what is going on, just from 
our own point of view, so we do monitor 
what is happening, but we would never in-
terfere, that wouldn't be correct, it would 
undermine the confidence of local manage-
ment. This is almost certainly the right 
description of the relationship between the 
UK, Dutch, German, etc, headquarters of 
parent companies and their Indian sub-
sidiaries: non-interference does not rule out 
either consultation (during a dispute, for 
example, such as the Philips lockout of 1981) 
or formulation of policy (on further cuts in 
employment, for example). What it does 
mean, however, is that parents are in no posi-
tion to exert any wholesale or active in-
fluence on local labour relations. This is an 
interesting situation because it allows for 
discrepancies if not actual conflicts within 
international corporate structures. Even 
when the staffing of top management func-
tions by foreign managers (the usual prac-
tice in international subsidiaries) can be a 
counteracting force, the inability of inter-
national management to affect local con-
flicts through any more direct mechanisms 
of control can lead to obvious frustration: 
when repeated strike actions closed the 
Firestone plant at Sewri for most of 1967 
and part of 1968, the only effective interven-
tion Akron could make, it seems, was to 
dismiss G L Anderson, who was then 
managing director and, presumably, its own 
representative! 
At any rate, the unions themselves are 
quite clear that personnel relations can 
change quite dramatically once international 
companies 'indianise' their management 
Notes: 'Local establishments' refers to all Maharashtra locations of the sample companies ex-
cluding plants, head offices, etc, which do not figure in any of the sample conflicts. The 
main Translocations' are Pokhran 1, Pokhran 2 and Kolshet; 'semi-rural centres' com-
prises the main Pune locations (Dapodi, Pimpri, Chinchwad, Akurdi, etc), Satpura and 
Ambad in Nasik, Aurangabad and Khopoli; 'dispersed rural' locations are Taloja, Shahad, 
Kalyan, Tarapur, Ambarnath or isolated locations in the countryside. 
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personnel and foreign managers leave, or 
when the company itself is taken over by an 
Indian group and the international f irm 
pulls out (as happened with Firestone early 
in the 80s). This general attitude or feeling 
is so widespread that it must reflect an ob-
jective difference in bragaining behaviour 
between the two groups of managers (NB: 
not types of companies). A worker with over 
25 years' experience at Firestone felt that 
though they did not have as much shopfloor 
contact, American managers were much less 
'mad about production' than the main group 
of Indian managers (four were mentioned 
by name). Clearly, this was not a charac-
terisation of management's objectives (all 
groups would be interested in production) 
but of ways of dealing with the workforce. 
In Pfizer, also American, Indianisation 
started in 1973 and led, according to the 
union, to a conscious change in management 
policy, for the worse. McGee, the American 
managing director upto 73, was a popular 
manager, used to mix with people and 
'would not drag so much'. In other words, 
there was more management resistance, once 
the change occurred. Not only that; 'Now 
for everything these people (i e, the Indian 
managers) have to refer to New York'. In 
Ciba-Geigy, also pharmaceuticals, the 
change occurred in 1969. Before that, in the 
early 60s there were six to seven Swiss 
managers, 'favourable' to the union. The 
Swiss attitude was 'You give us production, 
we'll give you money'. When the company 
declared a lay-off of almost two years in the 
early 60s, the general manager committed 
Ciba to paying almost full wages for the 
period. After Indianisation significant 
changes must have occurred because in 1980 
Ciba would resist a bonus demand with a 
lockout of nine-and-a-half months. The 
(Indian) manager said to be responsible for 
the lockout 'wants to finish the union', it was 
claimed. 
Even these examples are enough to show 
that for unions the decisive test of manage-
ment's (or a manager's) attitudes is its 
willingness to discuss. This is going to be an 
important variable in this study, the crucial 
factor which differentiates the good 
managements from the bad ones. Concep-
tually, it 'forms the basis of what this paper 
calls 'the Industrial Relations theory of in-
dustrial conflict', or the IR theory for short. 
Such a theory sees conflict as part of the 
bargaining system. As such it rejects the 
notion that the strike experience of in-
dividual plants is determined (funda-
mentally) by the industry to which they 
belong. Every plant belongs to an industry 
and has definite industrial characteristics— 
a certain kind of manufacturing process, 
stable or unstable markets, more or less 
highly qualified labour forces, etc But con-
flict belongs not to the plant itself but to its 
experience. The space it describes is pheno-
menological, not objective. There is no deter-
minism which can 'explain' a pattern of con-
flict. Workers are not bound to react, or 
bound to act in certain ways, or bound to 
act with a single conception. At every stage 
choices are possible. And even if manage-
ment behaviour conforms to certain deter-
minisms (the features which make up Capital 
in general' and 'many capitals': the drive to 
expand, to modernise, to increase efficien-
cy, etc), even managers face choices. 
Wi th respect to unions, the two most ob-
vious choices they face are (1) how soon they 
should settle once they have agreed to 
negotiate, and (2) whether to negotiate at all. 
The new manufacturing industries of the 
Bombay area were the first productive sec-
tors anywhere in the country to witness the 
widespread evolution of a bargaining struc-
ture at plant level. In this sense it would be 
perfectly possible to maintain that the form 
of industrial culture which characterises 
these sectors is one whose essential tendency 
is collective bargaining. However, this 
tendency exists initially only in an ideal 
form. In practice it takes considerable 
pressure including conflict to establish 
bargaining habits among employers—to get 
employers to accept unions and start 
negotiating on a regular basis. But once this 
habit evolves, it establishes not just a 
bargaining culture in the sense of a general 
willingness to negotiate and a rational 
perception, by employers, of the need for 
some forms of 'joint determination', but a 
bargaining system in the sense of something 
with institutional form and overriding ra-
tionality, e g, a predominant level at which 
agreements are negotiated (in Bombay the 
individual plant or establishment), a 
predominant cyclicity (three yean), accepted 
ways of justifying demands (bargaining 
criteria and orbits of comparison) or the 
evolution of a conflict rationality which is 
purely instrumental (slowing down to force 
management to the table, chargesheeting to 
secure a trade-off, etc). 
Whether to negotiate at all; initially, in 
fact, even in Bombay, employers were not at 
all inclined to negotiate. There is striking 
proof of this fact in the repeated need for 
courts to intervene to establish the most 
elementary types of service conditions in big 
Bombay companies which were already in 
operation by the 50s. The Industrial Award 
was the mechanism by which this happened 
and the first form in which, for many com-
panies, a classification system might emerge, 
manual grades finally receive a dearness 
allowance previously conceded only to staff, 
and so on. Foreign firms were no exception: 
Glaxo's conditions were defined by the 
Thakur Award of 1952, Parke-Davis' by the 
Bilgrami Award of 1959. Firestone is a strik-
ing example of a foreign plant with no ob-
vious tradition of bargaining for over two 
decades of its earliest activity. In existence 
by the 40s when it took a famous strike soon 
after independence, the company would only 
sign its first settlement in 1969! For most of 
the 60s conditions were governed by the 
Meher Award. For a whole series of big com-
panies (Voltas, Firestone, May & Baker, 
Tomco, etc) these early awards were the 
means by which companies were forced to 
extend a 'slab system' of DA to most sec-
tions of their staff. It was this system which 
would sustain pay levels through the infla-
tion of the 70s and 80s when employers 
would do their best to impose drastic ceil-
ings or evolve other formulas. 
As long as big companies, Indian or 
foreign, remained isolated features of the 
industrial landscape, resistance to bargain-
ing was a perfectly feasible employer stance. 
What decisively altered the balance in favour 
of the widespread acceptanc of a bargain-
ing culture (and the evolution of a bargain-
ing system) was the massive industrial ex-
pansion in relatively new parts of the city, 
out of which emerged whole productive sec-
tors, new workforces, rapid unionisation 
and, in the late 60s, new levels of strike 
activity. Throughout these years the move-
ment of conflict was a definite expression 
of the historically emerging system of col-
lective bargaining. The IR theory of in-
dustrial conflict involves seeing both strikes 
and lockouts as (basically) forms and effects 
of a bargaining system. But what sort of 
forms and effects do they represent? 
How soon to settle; there is in fact an ob-
jective indicator of the degree of resistance 
which a management poses to discussing 
and settling the claims of its employees. In 
work published by the Union Research 
Group (Bombay), this is called the 'bargain-
ing cycle' and is defined as the time elaps-
Note: Conflicts' refers to disputes entered in the registers as strikes or lockouts; thus the 'number 
of conflicts' is the total number of strikes and lockouts over the period 1956-84. 'Short 
conflicts' are disputes whose total duration is less than forty-eight hours; the minimum 
recorded duration for the sample is 20 minutes. 
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ing between the date of submission of a 
charter and the date of final settlement (or 
the date when the agreement is finally 
signed). The longer this interval, the greater 
the presumed resistance on the part of 
management. Faced with such resistance, 
there are several possible decisions a union 
would have to take: whether to apply any 
pressure, how much pressure to apply, what 
forms of pressure to apply, and for how 
long. Legalistic styles of unionism would in 
general imply that a union is unwilling or 
unable to apply any sort of pressure (other 
than the legal one!). As a general style of 
intervention legalism was badly discredited 
by the late 70s. What this means, pre-
sumably, is that workers could see that the 
kind of pressure represented by a case 
against the company was not sufficiently 
strong, not intense enough, to force a signifi-
cant retreat or even any sort of retreat on 
management. By then it was also clear that 
legalism was in fact a company strategy for 
avoiding or postponing a settlement in-
definitely; it was the standard form in which 
companies would tackle pay claims which 
they were simply unwilling to pay (e g, Hin-
dustan Lever with respect to the pay claims 
of head office staff). But despite ap-
pearances, strikes are not the obvious alter-
native to a fruitless legal battle. Workers may 
want to avoid strikes for precisely the same 
reasons for which they wish to avoid litiga-
tion: namely, that going on strike will cost 
them more than it will cost the company. 
This is in fact the rationality which underlies 
most of the reasoning behind the decision 
whether to strike. And because strikes 
generally involve wage losses which it could 
take years to recoup, striking is not the first 
option most workers (or unions) consider 
when deciding the issue of how much 
pressure and what forms of pressure. 
This establishes two things: (I) there is no 
a priori reason to identify strikes as the 
expression of a superior bargaining position, 
as the most effective or most aggressive 
stance workers can take in the face of 
employer recalcitrance—even if some 
unions, notably Samant;'s, base their 
bargaining strategies on a metaphysic of this 
type. On the contrary, the natural tendency 
of workers to avoid strike action, if they can 
help it, is a strong reason for supposing that 
if they strike at all, they do so because the-
company has left them with no option, not 
to strike, in the given situation, would mean 
a major tactical retreat, immediate submis-
sion or wholesale defeat, and since none of 
these are options in any real sense, one has 
to strike But ' in the given situation' is a pro-
blematic notion, since the givenness of a 
situation is never absolute (or no situation 
is ever given in an absolute sense). It presup-
poses (a) that strategic options have been 
progressively closed, that workers have tried 
every other means and failed, or (b) that they 
are not seriously aware of the range of op-
tions available to them. In either event, 
strikes need not represent the most militant 
or most effective form of bargaining 
behaviour. (2) A workforce fully aware of 
its strategic options would be aware of a 
whole range of possible forms of bargain-
ing pressure based on implying determinate 
types of industrial action. Thus there is a 
field of possibilities. It does not follow, of 
course, that there is a precise 'economic' 
calculation which enables unions to select 
a form of action in some objective way. On 
the other hand, it is almost certainly true 
that internal disruption of plants is generally 
the most effective way of maximising the 
costs of an action to the company relative 
to the self-inflicted costs. But not all unions 
would be willing or even able to pursue this 
sort of strategy. 
By a sort of correlation, the IR theory of 
conflict enables us to see lockouts as ways 
in which employers bargain, i e, refuse to 
negotiate, since the refusal to negotiate could 
be a feasible bargaining stance—where, for 
example, employers (i) want to pressurise 
workers into accepting important manage-
ment demands, or (ii) want to break the 
union. Perhaps the single most important 
result of this study is the staggering extent 
to which employers have started making use 
of the lockout. This is true of employers in 
the locations we deal with, but presumably 
also true of employers elsewhere in India. 
The most attractive feature of the IR 
theory is that it enables us to preserve and, 
in some sense, to account for the enormous 
diversity of experience with respect to con-
flict and industrial relations at plant level. 
The most usual form of deterministic ex-
planation claims to account for this diver-
sity in terms of differences between in-
dustries. But the prima facie appearance is 
very different one: the diversity of ex-
perience is a diversity between plants and 
herefore not so much between industries as 
within them. Searle and Pfizer arc both 
American controlled pharmaceutical plants 
barely ten minutes apart on the Thane-
Belapur Road. But in Searle the union can 
recollect no strikes or lockouts in the com-
pany's history, industrial relations are 
described as good and the management 
described as responsive. This reponsiveness 
is important because it was repeatedly cited 
by the union as a reason for not having any 
conflict ('no need for action'). Pfizer 
management has been much more ruthless 
and the plant's experience quite different. Its 
deployment practices forced serious divi-
sions in the workforce which in turn led to 
a major split in the union situation. During 
the Emergency management used this situa-
tion and the general climate of depression 
to force the union to accept a 50 per cent 
cut in DA and a ceiling on basic; in 1977 
when this happened they lost their bonus as 
well because the company introduced a PF 
scheme under which they paid not 20 per 
cent of gross but 12 per cent. In the years 
which follow of management used their pos-
tion to automate rapidly, making Pfizer the 
most automated pharmaceutical operation 
in the Bombay area. The personnel manager, 
Pritam Singh Nair, is said to have describ-
ed the Pfizer temporaries as a 'well-trained 
battalion'; i e, management could take a 
strike if it had to. And in 1980 it did—for 
111 days. It took the Pfizer Employees' 
Union over three years (38 months to be 
precise) to reach their settlement of the early 
80s. Examples of such glaring contrasts 
within identical product groups could be 
multiplied indefinitely. The IR experience of 
Bombay certainly does not support the no-
tion that industry is a primary influence in 
labour relations. 
What are the important factors? We 
would suggest that the pattern of conflict 
at plant level can be traced to a conjunction 
of two groups of variables: (i) union 
preferences with respect to the degree and 
forms of bargaining pressure: and (ii) from 
management's side its general 'way of deal-
ing with the union', especially its propensity 
to negotiate. If union preferences depend 
partly on the past tradition of bargaining ac-
tivity in the plant, at least as much of it as 
the union can remember, then management's 
way of dealing with the union is important 
if only because it contributes decisively to 
the tradition which shapes union pre-
ferences. In short, the IR theory states that 
conflict is plant-individuated and not 
industry-specific It stresses the autonomy 
and significance of IR culture and factors 
in accounting for the distribution of conflict 
both between plants and within plants over 
time. 
There is a methodological circularity 
which sustains deterministic models: the 
standard form in which disputes data is 
usually available predetermines the study of 
strikes as a study of the conflict patterns of 
entire industries or groups of industries: of 
Knowles, and Kerr and Siegel especially, but 
even Cronin's recent study of the UK or 
Michelle Durand's work on France. At these 
standard levels of aggregation where the 
strike experiences of numerous individual 
plants are 'averaged' into a more abstract 
sort of entity, namely, the experience of a 
whole industry (however that is defined), 
there is of course no way of making any sort 
of statements about what conflict actually 
means at the level of individual establish-
ments, and how workforces or managements 
differ in their approach to conflict. These 
interna! differences, between workforces or 
between companies, can clearly only begin 
to emerge if the data on disputes is retained 
in its original, establishment-level, form and 
not subjected to some form of aggregation 
too rapidly. 
I I 
Source and Sample 
The data we were able to secure is precisely 
of this form. It is drawn from two sets of 
registers which go by different names, but 
which are kept in the same office and intend-
ed to record every industrial dispute which 
takes the form of a strike or lockout 
anywhere in the state of Maharashtra, that 
is, in all (or at least most) areas of employ-
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ment in any of the main industrial concen-
trations (Greater Bombay, Thane, Thane-
Belapur, Pune, Nasik, etc) or of the 
numerous smaller locations spread through 
districts which are more purely rural. 
Disputes are recorded in these registers 
(a) manually, by the clerical staff employed 
in the office, and (b) following a standard 
rudimentary format, which is as follows: 
(i) Name of the establishment 
(ii) Location(s) involved in the dispute 
(iii) Starting and closing dates of the 
dispute 
(iv) Number of workers involved (workers' 
stands for all groups of employees) 
(v) Size of establishment 
(vi) The union or unions associated with 
the dispute 
(vii) Reason or reasons for the dispute 
(viii) Whether a strike or a lockout 
(ix) Outcome 
In transcribing data from this source, we 
decided to eliminate the category (ix), since 
subjective estimates of outcome are not 
likely to be helpful, and might be misleading, 
especially when only three options are open 
(successful/failed/compromise). 
Since the registration and recording of 
disputes is seen as a clerical function (as op-
posed to something assigned to a research 
department) and the staff seem to have no 
guidelines as to the form in which informa-
tion should be elicited and entered, beyond 
the schema just described, these records, the 
only ones of an official character, display 
some inevitable defects. The main ones are: 
(ii) frequent imprecision or inaccuracy about 
locations, (iii) some imprecision about dates, 
e g, discrepancies in the starting or closing 
date, sometimes in both, as between the two 
registers, (iv)-(v) when only one figure is 
cited, unclarity about whether that figure 
represents the size of the establishment or 
the numbers involved in the dispute; also, 
unclarity about whether establishment size 
is always defined to include the whole 
establishment, management included, or just 
bargainable categories, or even just the 
number of workers; as between the two 
registers, however, one shows a tendency to 
round off, while the other generally cites 
specific estimates which could only have 
been got from the company, (vi) when two 
or more unions are involved, unclarity about 
which union has initiated the dispute, and 
which unions are non-participant; also, oc-
casional inaccuracies regarding the affilia-
tion of a particular union, (vii) lack of in-
terest in the causes behind/reasons for the 
dispute and usually (but not so much in the 
early registers) only the most summary 
description of this aspect, e g, 'pay', 'general 
demands', 'reinstatement of suspended 
workers', but only rarely, 'protest against 
non-payment of wages to a workman who 
had refused to carry out the assigned work 
as additional help was not given to him', and 
(ix) no indication as to what constitutes a 
'successful' outcome as opposed to a 'com-
promise', and so on. 
Despite these defects, the data recorded 
in these registers through the patient labour 
of the office staff remain an invaluable 
source for any more precise sort of concep-
tion of basic features of the pattern of con-
flict in the state. Two final remarks about 
the source: for a large number of disputes 
which finally figure in our sample it was 
possible for us to have an independent con-
trol in the form of information on disputes 
obtained directly from the plants, through 
management or union. This stock of infor-
mation was built up over a number of years, 
through the work of the Union Research 
Group. Secondly, for us the most serious 
drawback of the registers is their neglect of 
the column* reporting issues. There is an 
important methodological reason for this, 
which Michelle Durand has drawn attention 
to. Standard causal explanations are relative-
ly uninterested by the issues behind conflicts. 
This is because 'the demands which in a 
sense are an invitation to explore the strike 
itself... simply figure as various sorts of im-
mediate or even local causes'. In the struc-
tural approach advocated by Durand and the 
IR theory followed by us, demands are 
crucial. The issues behind a conflict or 
reasons for a dispute are thus a vital dimen-
sion of disputes data. But in any form of 
large-scale data entry, at least three sorts of 
'simplifying assumptions' ale likely to be in-
volved here. First, that the grounds stated 
for a dispute by either or both of the par-
ties to a dispute are in some sense a reliable 
expression of what that dispute is about. 
This involves a simplification in the sense 
that there may be other grounds for the 
dispute which are not stated because, for 
example, the issues they involve are not 
negotiable or the real grievances do not 
translate so easily into demands. This relates 
to the standard sociological distinction bet-
ween 'latent' and 'manifest' causes. Second-
ly: that the basic issue or set of issues behind 
a conflict will not change while the conflict 
lasts; and thirdly, that the grounds- for a 
dispute have been accurately recorded in the 
official sources. 
The sample we work with is every dispute 
entered in the registers for any of the local 
(that is, state level) establishments controlled 
by a set of 125 Indian-registered companies: 
70 (56 per cent) Indian, 50 (40 per cent) 
Note: ' long conflicts' are conflicts whose recorded duration spans a minimum of 3 calendar 
days; they are 'long' as opposed to the 'short' conflicts; the really long conflicts are grouped 
together and studied separately. 
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purely foreign, and five (4 per cent) sharing 
characteristics of both. The total number of 
establishments controlled by these com-
panies and for which at least one dispute is 
recorded in the registers works out to 179. 
The only registers we could actually locate 
were those for 1956, 1957 and for the whole 
period from 1961 to 1984. There have been 
some major conflicts since 1984, one at the 
Kalwa plant of Philips, one at Nocil (the first 
in its history), a lockout at Modistone 
(previously Firestone), but these, obviously, 
are not considered here since they fall out-
side the sample period. The working sam-
ple is drawn from a more extensive list of 
disputes for which it was decided to 
transcribe every dispute occurring, anywhere 
in Maharashtra, in any establishment con-
trolled by the main large or middle-sized 
companies active in manufacturing ex-
cluding textiles. Thus textiles, non-manu-
facturing (banking, transport, etc) and small 
firms were the main casualties of the selec-
tion process. What the transcribed sample 
effectively isolated was 'modern industry' in 
the areas around Bombay, the kinds of 
manufacturing which emerged in the 50s and 
60s when the government abandoned its op-
position to the operation of foreign firms 
and allowed import of technology on a large 
scale. 
How much of the actual total volume of 
conflict does the working sample finally cap-
ture? By the end of the 70s our registers were 
recording a total of well over 600 disputes 
per year. (For the period 1978-1981, when 
there was a rapid escalation in the level of 
conflict, the second peak of the 70s, they 
recorded an average of 566 strikes and 70 
lockouts.) This means that our sample cap 
tures about 8 per cent of the total number 
of conflicts noted in the registers. As a pro 
portion of all conflicts occurring in the 
manufacturing sectors which the sample 
studies, the coverage is likely to be well over 
50 per cent. 
I l l 
Frequencies, Durat ions and Issues 
The 'results' are presented in two sections. 
The first deals with Tables 3-8 and describes 
results involving either (i) ail sample conflicts 
or (ii) all conflicts with a minimum dura-
tion of three calendar days. The next section 
will deal with Tables 9-19 which embody the 
results for only the major conflicts (long 
conflicts with a minimum duration of 60 
consecutive calendar days) and for conflict 
intensity levels. 
As bargaining habits have become 
generalised among employers (though not, 
it seems, among the powerful group which 
controls Bombay's textile industry and who 
are rigidly organised behind the Bombay 
Millowners' Association), largely under the 
pressure of the unions, management's 
average 'propensity to negotiate has un-
doubtedly increased. Take a not untypical 
case of this evolution: the Greaves Cotton 
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and Allied Companies' Employees' Union 
was established in 1946 on the initiative, 
mainly, of people in Greaves Cotton (then 
British-controlled, and later one of the firms 
which floated Crompton Greaves, now con-
trolled by the Thapars); yet for almost 26 
years of the federation's existence, the ser-
vice conditions pf Greaves Cotton employees 
continued to be defined by a series of 
awards: in 1946, 1950, 1959; the first 
negotiated settlement on general demands 
occurred only in 1974! and it took the union 
three-and-a-half years to reach that agree-
ment because the company wanted a DA 
ceiling (which it did not finally get). But 
since 1974 there have been at least two other 
agreements: so after a prolonged period of 
simply refusing to negotiate, a phase came 
when management would even sign three 
agreements in the space of nine years. 
One important reason why there is less ap-
parent resistance to signing agreements on 
some regular cycle is the idea, now increas-
ingly popular among Bombay manage-
ments, of using agreements as a way in 
which they can get their own demands 
through—that is to say, accepting collective 
bargaining but giving it an employer's 
rationality. Insofar as employers see 
agreements in this way, there is no reason 
why they should not have or show a propen-
sity to negotiate. But, and this is the impor-
tant point here, this can also mean a refusal 
to negotiate on employee demands as long 
as management demands are not accepted. 
Now these are precisely the sorts of features 
which are reflected in the individual dimen-
sions of a dispute. 'Duration' and 'type of 
dispute' (strike/lockout) are related to (a) set-
tling time, which measures the degree of 
employer resistance to settling; (b) union per-
sistence, or the employees' determination to 
hold out in the face of employer resistance— 
this implies the capacity to hold out but does 
not necessarily mean that the longer a strike, 
the stronger a union; (c) a refusal to 
negotiate at all, which would reflect in 
longer conflict durations and a higher fre-
quency of lockouts. But ail of this occurs 
in time. There is a constant evolution which 
changes the conditions under which unions 
confront employers, a historical movement 
which affects industry if only because it af-
fects all sectors of the life of a country. This 
'conjunctural' movement is vital to the way 
industrial conflict looks at any given time, 
because by altering the general correlation 
of forces (between employers and employees) 
the conjuncture affects bargaining 
psychology in a fundamental way, and 
through this rates of conflict (the frequen-
cy with which open confrontations occur), 
conflict durations (both the willingness and 
the capacity to hold out) and the aggressive-
ness with which employers hit back. 
Employers in India have always been sen-
sitive to this wider 'political' conjuncture, for 
example, the union at Pfizer can recall that 
in 1964, shortly after the clash with China 
Pfizer management launched its own minor 
offensive, with the introduction of a six-day 
week: 'We lost Saturdays and 11 bank 
holidays'. 
A very rough periodisation might help to 
set the 'results' in a broader historical 
background: (1) throughout the 50s and 60s 
a few large key firms reach settlements 
through awards; these are years of industrial 
expansion, of the large-scale emergence of 
modern manufacturing sectors (petro-
chemicals, electronics and electrical 
engineering, above all pharmaceuticals...), 
plants arc being commissioned, or re-
locating, workforces are looking around for 
unions, much of the conflict which does ex-
ist is led by the same group of more (for that 
period) militant trade unions (notably the 
Bombay Labour Union associated with the 
Socialist Party); so the whole picture is one 
of flux, only the older firms have stable con-
ditions. (2) 1968-74, a phase of rapid union 
expansion, a lot of firms which were unionis-
ed in the 60s now have to settle, there is a 
massive increase in the level of bargaining 
Economic and Political Weekly August 25, 1990 
activity, a stable bargaining culture begins 
to emerge, but in and through conflict Strike 
frequencies peak towards the end of this 
phase; which is also, of course, a period of 
intense political unrest as an 'opposition' 
emerges to Congress, which breaks the hold 
of the party in several states, is out-
manoeuvred and tries desperately to recover 
ground. (3) 1975-77, the Emergency years, 
large groups of people are terrorised into 
quiet submission, strike activity declines 
sharply, managements become more ag-
gressive and take advantage of the general 
depression. (4) 1977-81, massive escalation 
in the level and intensity of conflict as the 
Emergency is lifted and employees hit back; 
but by now Indian employers have started 
to make repeated use of the lockout; their 
right to do so is not challenged legally; the 
period ends with the catastrophic defeat of 
the textile strike; thousands of textile workers 
lose their jobs and a general phase of 'ra-
tionalisation' becomes increasingly evident, 
throughout industry. Finally, (5) the early 
80s, the ruling psychology is defensive, a 
lower frequency of conflicts overall, but a 
significantly higher relative frequency of 
lockouts, and a dramatic extension of con-
flict durations. Attitudes harden, on both 
sides; managements start using agreements 
to push through their own demands. 
Table 3 shows that there is no major dif-
ference between Indian and foreign control-
led companies in overall conflict frequency: 
in other words, foreign companies are not 
conflict-free enclaves. The average frequency 
for the sample as a whole is at least eight 
conflicts (per company) over the sample 
period, but Indian firms have had slightly 
more than this (8.4), foreign firms slight!) 
less (7.7). In foreign plants, half of the sam-
ple conflicts are short (that is, not exceeding 
48 hours and in most cases lasting only a 
few hours), but the proportion is not 
significantly lower in the other groups. With 
respect to lockouts the pattern is much more 
distinctive and almost certainly significant. 
Eight per cent of all conflicts in the foreign 
sector have taken the form of lockouts 
(disregarding differences between periods), 
whereas in Indian companies the proportion 
is 13 per cent. Our figures indicate that on 
average an Indian-controlled company 
would have had at least one lockout in the 
sample period. There is no doubt that what 
this indicates is a systematic use of the 
lockout which may very well be the single 
most distinctive feature of the IR behaviour 
of employers in India. The typical joint ven-
tures behave ambiguously: in their frequency 
of conflict per company, they resemble the 
foreign plants, in terms of the relative 
predominance of short conflicts they fall 
between the two groups, in their occurrence 
of lockouts they are like the Indian establish-
ments. This seems to suggest that in such 
firms (viz, Otis, Vickers Sperry, Indal [these 
three run by the Mahindras], Ralliwolf and 
Century Enka), employees behave like 
workforces in foreign plants, while 
(Contd) 
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employers behave like employer! in the 
Indian group. 
Table 4 introduces the time dimension by 
five-year periods. The overall number of 
conflict (short + long) escalates through 
most of the sample period and peaks in the 
late 70s. This could reflect the actual move-
ment in manufacturing but if we take an an-
nual breakdown of the total volume of con-
flict reported in the registers (manufactur-
ing and non-manufacturing) the peak seems 
to come slightly later, in 1980-81 (the Figures 
are: 1978-630.1979-619,1980-663,1981-636). 
It seems likely that the rapidly escalating 
conflict levels of the post-Emergency period 
did in fact climax earlier in the big com-
panies which were almost certainly catalysts 
in the general unrest throughout industry. 
However, the overall curve combines conflic-
ting movements: the rapid shopfloor con-
frontations which make their way into the 
registers as short conflicts show a different 
pattern. In the Indian sector conflicts of this 
type decline progressively from 69 per cent 
of alt conflicts in the earliest period (up to 
1964) to only 18 per cent in the early 80s; 
indeed, even the absolute number of such 
conflicts declines in the last two periods 
(1975-1984); for foreign firms there are two 
opposed phases—the predominance of short 
conflicts in the early period actually in-
creases up to the early 70s when they come 
to account for 67 per cent or two out of 
every three foreign company conflicts; but 
from the late 70s the movement is reversed 
and short conflicts decline both relatively 
and in absolute terms. It looks as if a general 
tendency is forcing itself through but with 
some retention of traditional patterns in the 
foreign plants; thus even in the early 80s, at 
least 30 per cent of all foreign-Company con-
flicts continue to be confrontations of the 
rapid kind. 
Long conflicts (those lasting at least three 
days, and generally of course much longer, 
several weeks or months) behave very dif-
ferently, increasing continuously through all 
periods* to peak in the 80s. One should note 
the sharp increase in the number of such 
conflicts in Indian firms in the late 60s, as 
if signifying that if there was ever an in-
dustrial consensus in Bombay industry, it 
collapsed more rapidly here, whereas in the 
foreign sector it seems to persist t i l l the end 
of the 60s, then starts cracking slowly in the 
early 70s, to collapse completely in the 
general upheaval at the end of that decade. 
And this is our first indication of an in-
teresting feature of the results: the general 
tendencies of industrial conflict in the 
Bombay area are first pre-figured, always, 
by movements in the Indian sector. For 
foreign firms there are fewer long conflicts 
in the 80s, as if a consensus was re-emerging; 
but the absolute level of such disputes re-
mains high, and not significantly below the 
late 70s peak; and certainly, there is no 
reduction in the intensity of conflict in this 
period, as other movements (duration, 
lockouts) wi l l show. 
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Table 5 introduces the 'strike/lockout 
ratio', which measures the frequency of one 
type of dispute (initiated by workers) in rela-
tion to the other (initiated by management). 
There is a sustained, rapid decline in the S/L 
ratio between 1965 and 1984 (which cor-
responds, of course, to an increase in the 
proportion of lockouts), a result which im-
plies an increasing aggressiveness on the part 
of employers. But such aggressiveness is 
likely to reflect not only the higher overall 
combativity of their workforces but the fact 
(also highly significant) that among these 
workforces there is an increasing recourse to 
forms of industrial action, especially go-
slows, which employers have no means of 
crushing or at least containing other than 
the lockout. Thus a declining S/L ratio need 
not imply only an increase in employer 
militancy, it could also reflect, and probably 
does, an increasing sophistication in the 
forms of industrial action used against 
employers. 
In both sectors strike frequencies peak in 
the late 70s, lockouts in the 80s. The obvious 
implication seems to be that the 80s repre-
sent an employer backlash against the 
dramatic spurt in union militancy in the late 
70s. But in that case it would be more ac-
curate to visualise the backlash as a deeper 
reaction whose forms include changing 
employer strategies and to see these strategies 
as having an independent effect on the 
intensity of conflict. An unwillingness to 
deal with certain unions, that is, the use of 
lockouts against them, may well be mainly 
a response to the late 70s, but a more fun-
damental movement would have to account 
for the tendency of managements, in the 
same period, to formulate demands of their 
own and make settlements conditional on 
their acceptance. In any case, there is a dif-
ference of rhythm in the genral evolution of 
the 'employers' offensive'—in the foreign sec-
tor the number of lockouts remains low to 
the very end of the 70s, then increases 
dramatically (four-fold) in the 80s; in Indian 
firms the movement starts earlier and its 
development is both consistent and rapid. 
Again, the pattern of conflict is clearly 
hegemonised by managements in the Indian 
sector. 
A chaotic, apparently random variation 
in the length of individual disputes is likely 
to be a characteristic of any sample which 
groups together a large number of plan con-
flicts. In our sample disputes can range from 
20 minutes to over a year and clearly it 
makes no sense to treat these types as even 
remotely comparable. Thus the analysis of 
conflict durations abstracts from the short 
conflicts on the grounds that in such con-
flicts duration is a purely notional dimen-
sion; in practice it makes no difference to 
the nature of these disputes whether they last 
for less than a shift or range over a succes-
sion of shifts, since, within certain limits, 
they continue to retain their general 
character as spontaneous outbreaks. 
Table 6 studies the movement of durations 
over the sample period. In Indian firms the 
average duration, of three plus strikes in-
creases sharply throughout the 70s, then ap-
pears to stabilise; the duration of foreign 
strikes progresses only gradually until a sud-
den, dramatic increase (89 per cent) occurs 
in the last period. Thus, over all groups of 
establishments, strike durations peak in the 
80s, though this conceals two distinct 
movements—a very slight increase in the 
duration of Indian strikes in this period but 
a sharp increase in the duration of foreign 
strikes which actually reverses the Indian/ 
foreign strike duration differential: in other 
words, by the 80s, the strikes in foreign-
controlled plants are beginning to last con-
siderably longer than those in the Indian 
companies. If increasing durations express 
the subtle hardening of attitudes, then again 
at this level it appears that the crisis starts 
off in the Indian sector, somewhere in the 
70s, and reaches the foreign plants only in 
the 80s. 
There appear to be three phases: (a) a 
sharp differentiation of sectors, with Indian 
companies taking much longer strikes 
than the foreign managements (1956-64), 
(b) homogenisation of the sectors as in-
dustrial conflict is generalised, i e, both sec-
tors register progressive increases in strike 
duration in 65-79, but the foreign plants only 
gradually, Indian firms more rapidly. For the 
latter this would imply one or both of 
the following situations: (i) that Indian 
employers become less willing to settle, so 
employees in these firms encounter more 
resistance; (ii) that employees in Indian-
controlled companies are now actually 
capable of sustaining strike action for much 
longer periods and are also, of course, less 
willing to submit, (c) the third phase (1980-84 
reverses this pattern, with foreign strikes 
moving sharply upwards while Indian strike 
durations register almost no increase. This 
striking reversal in the Indian/ foreign strike 
duration differential certainly indicates that 
foreign sector managements pose sudden 
resistance in the 80s, and react to the claims 
of their employees with an obduracy more 
characteristic of the Indian firms. Coupled 
with the declining relative predominance of 
the short strike in foreign establishments, 
what this seems to indicate is the progressive 
diffusion of a model of industrial relations 
whose basic form was already given in the 
evolution of an Indian company conflict 
pattern. Finally, in the joint ventures strike 
durations display an evolution closer to 
foreign strikes, which could be taken to im-
ply that the employees in Otis, Vickers, etc, 
behave like foreign sector workforces, but it 
is quite possible that the results are less 
systematic and cannot be interpreted in this 
way-
Still on Table 6: the general movement by 
which lockouts become progressively longer, 
through four successive phases of the sam-
ple, is exactly analogous to the way strike 
durations behave. The determination of 
employers to force their employees into sub-
mission is most obvious in the 80s, for that 
is when lockout durations reach their high 
point, to display the incredible tenacity by 
which the average management is apparently 
willing to close its plants for close to four 
months in order to have its way! For the 
Indian companies, the period of sharpest in-
crease in the duration of lockouts is the late 
70s; by this period both frequency and 
average duration double, which implies an 
enormous increase in the intensity of con-
flict, from the employers' side, and shows, 
incidentally, that a 'backlash' effect is 
already at work before the end of the decade. 
We have to visualise the period after the 
Emergency as a phase when employers op-
pose to the militancy of their workforces an 
'employers' militancy'. However, foreign-
management-declared lockouts are con-
siderably shorter than Indian company 
lockouts, except for one period, which im-
plies (a) more bitterness in the conflicts bet-
ween Indian employers and their workforces, 
(b) greater irrationality in the way these 
employers run their plants, and probably 
(c) greater bargaining power on the part of 
workers in foreign companies. But even in 
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these companies the fundamental evolution 
is similar and based on a model determined 
by the Indian sector. 
The lockout/strike duration differential' 
which measures the aggressiveness and 
bargaining strength of one group (manage-
ment) relative to the other (employees) is 
maximal in the late 70s but remains well 
above 2.0 throughout the period 1975-1984. 
During these years the production losses of 
one lockout are equal to those of some two 
and a half strikes, ceteris paribus. But this 
pattern is heavily dominated by the lockouts 
of the Indian companies (the value of the 
differential is 2.81 in the Indian sector, 1.58 
in foreign plants). Finally, the joint venture 
lockouts can even be scrutinised individually: 
of the five companies in this category, two. 
had had no lockouts t i l l 1984; of the remain-
ing three, Vickers Sperry and Indal account 
for two each, and in both cases the second 
lockout is considerably longer than the first 
and tests over five and a half months; in the 
five sample lockouts of this group the 
longest disputes come from the late 70s/80s, 
which confirms the general postulate of a 
spectacular increase in employer militancy 
in this period. 
Tables 7and 8 study a third dimension, 
as fundamental as frequency and duration, 
namely, the issues which conflicts arc about. 
'Being about1 is subject to the reservations 
we made earlier: the issues which sustain a 
conflict in the sense of supplying its motive 
force need not be the issues because of which 
the conflict was sparked off. The Pfizer 
strike of 1980-81 is a perfect example of this 
distinction: in the registers the issue behind 
this strike is given as 'signing of fresh agree-
menf and this was confirmed in discussions 
with the employees' union, according to 
which provident fund and the charter were 
the main issues. In fact, the strike started 
spontaneously when Mendes and Pereira, 
leading office-bearers of the Pfizer Em-
ployees' Union, were mobbed and man-
handled by supporters of a rival union ('As 
they were walking in the corridor in front 
of the canteen') and management took no 
action. The legal mechanism of the strike 
notice which is a way of eliminating spon-
taneity from industrial conflict would nor-
mally prevent this sort of clash from mov-
ing any further, but it was possible for 
Pfizer's protest to become a strike because 
luckily the union had earlier served a strike 
notice on a totally different issue—against 
automation! 
Now if the experience of Bombay and sur-
rounding companies is anything to go by, the 
forms of consciousness which underlie in-
dustrial conflict in the typical sectors of 
modern industry do not display the sort of 
chatacteristics assigned to normal working 
class consciousness by the notion of 
'economism. This can be construed as the 
argument that as long as employees are con-
fined to normal, trade union forms of ac-
tivity and their work or employment rela-
tionships form the only source of their con-
scious experience, the spontaneous modes of 
consciousness displayed in their behaviour 
and activity wi l l fail to constitute any real 
awareness of the true nature of their social 
relations, including any awareness which 
might be called potentially revolutionary. 
But in our sample less than half the prin-
cipal issues cited as reasons for conflict are 
pay-related. Conflicts on non-pay issues, 
especially disputes involving clashes with 
managerial authority, are as widespread and 
common in Bombay companies as conflicts 
on pay. Overall, pay issues constitute 36 per 
cent of the major issues; disputes intended 
to force management to reverse or revoke a 
decision involving disciplinary action are 
next in importance, with 21 per cent. This 
is followed by a series of conflicts in which 
the main issue relates to, or stems from, the 
nature of the relationship between manage-
ment and union, or between individual 
managers and individual employees; their 
share is close to 18 per cent. Finally, con-
flicts on deployment, that is, on the forms 
of mobility and management's way of using 
labour, account for 9½ per cent of listed 
occurrences of a principal issue. 
Three features of these results are worth 
developing: If one were to take the relative 
predominance of pay issues as an operational 
index of the prevalence of 'economism' 
within a given working class, then in 1971 
there was considerably more 'economism' in 
the French working class than among 
employees in Bombay. According to Michelle 
Durand's figures, in a total of 4,585 demands 
counted for disputes occurring in France in 
that year, the share of pay issues (salaires) 
was as much as 49.7 per cent; this contrasts 
with 36.2 per cent in our sample. In fact, 
however, a comparison of this sort is unlikely 
to make any sense, since modern industry 
creates the same conditions for employees, 
whichever country they work in , and dif-
ferences between groups of industries or 
kinds of workforces are likely to be more 
significant for the structure of issues than 
differences between the workers employed 
by big companies in various parts of the 
world. On the other hand, it is significant 
that in Durand's study 'Droits syndicaux, 
repression, etc', i e, purely IR issues related 
to the degree of resistance which manage-
ments pose to union activity in their plants, 
account for 10.6 per cent of issues listed in 
France, but at least 17.7 per cent of the 
Bombay issues. 
There is no obvious difference between 
Indian and foreign companies in their 
relative emphasis on pay. However, certain 
differences exist in the relative importance 
of conflicts against the various types of 
disciplinary action. Relative to the disputes 
within each sector, there is more conflict over 
charge-sheeting in the foreign plants, but 
more conflict over suspensions in Indian 
companies. This almost certainly indicates 
that in plants under Indian control a lot of 
the disciplinary action escalates into suspen-
sions (or that charge-sheets escalate more 
rapidly into suspensions) whereas in foreign 
plants much of the disciplinary action re-Note: L/S = lockout/strike duration differential; ( ) indicate a single case. 
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mains at the level of charge-sheeting (or 
fewer charge-sheets are actually converted 
into suspensions). But this general difference 
between the two sorts of firms could be in-
terpreted at cither of two levels: (a) It could 
mean that in general employees in foreign 
companies are more successful (or have been 
more successful) in fighting charge-sheets, 
whereas despite resistance Indian company 
managements force their way through to 
suspensions, (b) It could also mean that 
managements in foreign companies make a 
conscious use of charge-sheets as a way of 
bargaining with their workforces, so that 
some indeterminate proportion of the 
charge-sheeting which occurs in these 
establishments has a purely instrumental 
significance, that is, is not seriously intended 
to progress any further. (This aspect will be 
expanded below.) Another almost certainly 
significant difference between the two 
groups of companies is the higher incidence 
of conflicts on deployment in the foreign 
plants. That is to say, management's opera-
tional control and its personnel decisions en-
counter visibly more resistance in the foreign 
establishments. The chief examples of this 
pattern are conflicts on (a) promotion and 
upgrading (12 foreign conflicts against only 
three Indian), (b) production standards and 
manning levels (11 foreign, six Indian), and 
(c) refusal of job assignments (four foreign, 
one Indian). The chief exceptions to the pat-
tern, that is, more resistance from Indian 
workforces are (d) demands for job classi-
fication (six Indian, no foreign) and 
(e) transfer of personnel to other jobs, 
departments, machines, etc, (13 Indian, seven 
foreign). Again, one probable implication of 
such differences in degrees of resistance to 
specific forms of deployment is that foreign 
company managements have been careful 
about the way they handle certain issues 
(notably, the classification system) but in 
general unwilling to cede any control, 
e g, unwilling to negotiate, in areas which 
they (like most managements everywhere) 
regard as their prerogative (notably, promo-
tions, manning, job assignment). Finally, in 
the Indian companies there is a more ob-
vious preoccupation with retrenchment and 
permanency, especially the former (of 30 
sample conflicts where retrenchment is the 
key issue, 25 are from Indian plants); with 
methods of supervision and the general way 
of treating employees including the way 
managers speak to them; and with manage-
ment's relations with the union. 
Our analysis is able to define an absolutely 
decisive feature of the Bombay system of in-
dustrial relations: the bargaining behaviour 
of Bombay managements (and presumably 
of private sector managements throughout 
the country) is characterised by a conscious, 
massive and widespread use of disciplinary 
action. As Table 8 shows, strikes against 
discipline, i e, actions intended to force 
management to withdraw charge-sheets or 
warning letters or to revoke suspension or 
dismissal orders are the main form of con-
flict on" issues other than pay (forming 33 
per cent of these conflicts). However, it is 
important to make the following distinction; 
between (i) recourse to disciplinary action 
as the expression of an underlying manage-
ment authoritarianism and (ii) a purely 
strategic use of disciplinary action as part 
of a bargaining or conflict process. The 
distinction is probably crucial to a deeper 
understanding of the Bombay system of in-
dustrial relations, (a) because the structure 
of the disciplinary process, with its possi-
ble but not automatic progression from less 
to more serious forms of action gives 
managements an enormous flexibility in the 
use of such action as their major form of 
bargaining pressure; this flexibility is in no 
way reduced by the specific formulations of 
model standing orders where 'misconduct' is 
defined in ostensive terms, by enumerating 
acts specifically stated to amount to mis-
conduct; 'wi l ful insubordination or disobe-
dience of any lawful and reasonable order', 
'wilful slowing down in performance of 
work', and 'commission of any act subver-
sive of discipline or good behaviour on the 
premises of the establishment', leave 
employers free to cover an extremely wide 
range of behaviour under grounds for 
disciplinary action, (b) Authoritarian vs 
strategic charge-sheeting, etc,, implies 
another distinction between a legal deter-
mination (employer authority) and a more 
purely technical one (management control) 
which almost certainly expresses a major dif-
ference in behaviour between the average 
Indian-controlled establishment and the 
more advanced foreign ones. Indian com-
pany managements have a reputation, 
among unions locally, for being 'autocratic 
family managements who have not changed 
their attitudes since independence' (this was 
how one experienced trade unionist actually 
described them). The companies themselves 
strike people as functioning with a 'malik 
and naukar kind of mentality' (this said by 
an employee who felt that in his own com-
pany, American-controlled, the system was 
quite different: 'Here, no one's the boss'). 
Now an important part of this real or per-
ceived difference is due to the fact that in 
foreign subsidiaries (most, if not all) 
managements are much more careful about 
the way, the purposes for which, they use 
disciplinary action, lb use charge-sheets and 
suspensions to force bargaining concessions 
from the union implies an altogether dif-
ferent sort of calculation from the sort of 
management behaviour which uses these 
quasi-legal instruments in a much harsher 
and more indiscriminate way as a form of 
reprisal, or to force employees to accept 
management demands, or to break the 
union. But the example of Philips shows that 
when the IR system of a company lurches 
into crisis, which happened in Philips after 
the Pune lockout in 81, even foreign-
controlled managements can resort to purely 
authoritarian uses of disciplinary action. 
Following a major change in its personnel 
strategy, Philips management decided to 
break the federation by launching its first 
attacks in Pune; after crushing the union in 
Pune Philips would extend the attack to 
other centres of agitation within the com-
pany, lb break the Pune union, management 
resorted to dismissals. Nothing displays bet-
ter the largely authoritarian character of this 
action than the fact that it was, indeed, 
blatantly contrary to accepted legal pro-
cedure. Under standing orders, the basic set 
of rules which governs employer/employee 
relations, a showcause notice must be issued; 
the Pune dismissals were based on a com-
mon letter and skipped all the stages which 
companies normally run through before 
finally terminating an employee's service. 
Note: Employees' unions are unions whose 
name comprises some essential reference 
to the company, such as Pfizer 
Employees' Union, Hindustan Lever 
Employees' Union, etc, regardless of the 
extent to which the committee depends 
on an outsider (or 'professional') for 
guidance, leadership, and so on. Exter-
nal unions are unions of outsiders or 
professionals' which the employees of 
a plant or other establishment affiliate 
to and whose name (AEW, MGKU, etc) 
appears on their agreement. 
Note. The figures outside brackets indicate the 
number of unions which have led con-
flicts or been involved in conflicts, at any 
stage, in any of the sample 
establishments, excluding purely 
marginal cases where a union tried to 
enter and failed. 
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Philips is in fact a striking example of the 
rapid escalation of conflict levels and 
dramatic increase in the" intensity of conflict 
which, according to the analysis of this sec-
tion, seems to have occurred from the late 
70s. The example shows not only that foreign 
companies in the Bombay area are not 
conflict-free enclaves, islands which sleep 
unobtrusively in the sunshine of some 
tropical liberalism, but that in any company, 
whatever the nature of the control exercised 
over its business, what counts is the con-
scious effort which a management makes to 
secure stability through the way it deals with 
its employees, the kind of attitudes it 
displays towards them, and with represen-
tatives of employees. 
I V 
Major Conf l ic ts , Locat ion and 
U n i o n Effects, and Conf l i c t 
In tens i ty 
This section deals with a special type of 
conflict, the hard conflicts which unions and 
companies have failed to resolve even when 
two months have passed. Obviously this is 
a purely arbitrary cut-off point, but it yields 
a sufficiently large sample (N = 157) for 
some kind of analysis to proceed. Through 
but what follows, the term used to refer to 
the specific area of hard conflict (in the sense 
of disputes which last at least two months) 
wil l be 'major conflicts'. 
Major conflicts peaked sharply in the 80s. 
Thus the general movement defined earlier 
of increasing bitterness in industrial disputes 
after the mid-seventies and throughout the 
period 1975-1984, is abundantly confirmed 
by the evolution of this special group of con-
flicts. In terms of the total volume of such 
conflict, in each of the sample periods there 
are over twice as many disputes of this length 
among Indian firms as among the foreign 
establishments. Thus whereas Indian firms 
account for some 58 per cent of all sample 
conflicts (see Table 3), their share of major 
conflicts is almost 70 per cent (see Table 9). 
In general terms this certainly signifies 
an important difference in the conflict 
behaviours of Indian/foreign establish-
ments. That is to say, even if the foreign sec-
tor is not free of conflict, much of the more 
bitter, protracted conflict has occurred in 
firms which have no foreign connections and 
which arc purely subject to Indian control. 
A second difference: the two types of 
disputes (strikes/lockouts) display different 
rhythms of evolution. Major strikes peak in 
the late 70s and stay at that level into the 
80s, so there is no obvious increase in con-
flicts of this sort between these periods. 
Indian-management lockouts (exceeding two 
months) increase sharply in the late 70s 
(from two to 14!), then continue to escalate 
in the 80s (from 14 to 29). Thus we should 
see the whole period from the Emergency 
to the middle 80s as one of rapidly escalating 
employer aggressiveness against workforces 
in Indian-dominated businesses. The foreign 
evolution is different: foreign-controlled 
lockouts remain at a low level down to the 
end of the 70s, then increase four-fold in the 
80s. This is a clear indication, from the 
employers' side, of the timing of the break 
in the IR system of Indian companies and 
of the retarded diffusion of this model in 
the foreign sector. In terms of the initiatives 
taken by employers, it is certainly the Indian 
firms which determine the character and 
pace of evolution of labour conflict. 
One implication of these differential 
rhythms for strikes and lockouts is a con-
sistent decline in the S/L ratio for major 
conflicts: in the early liberal phase of 
Bombay industrial relations (fifties and most 
of the sixties), the initiative in major con-
flicts clearly lies with employees. By the 
eighties there has been a massive reversal of 
this pattern; by this stage, the number of 
major lockouts actually exceeds the number 
of major strikes. That is to say, if there were 
some form of statutory ban or restriction on 
the length of industrial disputes, employers 
would stand to lose more than their 
employees. 
Table 10 shows that there is no substan-
tial difference in the duration of major 
strikes and major lockouts, i e, the 
lockout/strike duration differential is not 
significantly above 1. This implies that 
beyond certain temporal limits, determina-
tion and persistence are equally strong on 
both sides. Now the fact that the solidarity 
and cohesiveness of a group of strikers show 
no tendency to disintegrate spontaneously 
will be a strong inducement to employers to 
force a return to work by some means. There 
are several possible strategies employers can 
have to try and force a return to work. In 
central government strikes the strategies used 
can plunge whole workforces into the 
nightmare of confronting a 'political' 
employer who can use the armed force of 
the state in a crude, authoritarian assertion 
of bargaining power. This wi l l emerge only 
too clearly when the real history of the great 
Railway Strike of 1974 is finally written. In 
the private sector, the two main strategies 
have been: (a)"forcing divisions within the 
workforce so that some sections start favour-
ing an immediate return to work; (b) the 
large-scale recruitment of strike breakers so 
that production is re-started and the strike 
never finally settled. It is worth noting that 
whereas most managements including 
foreign control led managements (cf, 
Goodlass in the 1977-78 strike, John sen in 
the 1983 strike) would use, or at least to 
use, strategy,(a), only the more openly 
repressive groups of Indian employers (the 
millowners in the Bombay textile strike of 
81, Viren Shah in the Mukand strike of 1984) 
have resorted directly to strategy (b). 
Chronologically, the differential fluctuates 
only within narrow limits; the increase in 
management's drive to break the wi l l o f its 
workforce is matched by the ability of 
workers to sustain increasingly long strikes. 
In others words, the curves of the two 
types of conflicts behave with remarkable 
similarity throughout our period, display-
ing two distinct phases: (a) 1953-74—stable 
durations at just over three months, and 
(b) 1975-84—rapidly increasing durations, 
first four and then five months. But the pat-
tern differs considerably between sectors. In 
the Indian sector, strike durations increase 
by a month in the late 70s, and again by a 
month in the 80s; on the employers' side, the 
evolution of lockouts reflects the same type 
of movement, in fact the tenacity of these 
managements gives the Indian lockouts of 
the 80s an average duration of almost six 
months. In the foreign companies, average 
strike durations remain stable down to the 
end of the 70s, then increase by over a month 
in the early 80s; but here there is no cor-
responding movement in the way lockouts 
behave; in the foreign sector, it is the use of 
the long lockout that increases (12 foreign 
lockouts in the 80s but only five in the whole 
of the 70s), not its duration. So the 
lockout/strike duration differential of 
foreign plants is actually less than 1, and in 
a period when the managements in these 
companies have started using lockouts 
altogether more systematically. (The foreign-
controlled sample establishments where a 
lockout was declared during 1980-84 were: 
Note: N - 186 because more than one issue may be listed under each conflict; 'overall' includes 
companies classified as joint ventures; 'union conflicts' comprises cases of rivalry bet-
ween unions as well as management opposition to particular unions; 'various' comprises 
the following reported issues: transport, canteen food, assault on managing director, sud-
den strike of spinners, breach of agreement, etc 
M-146 Economic and Political Weekly August 25, 1990 
Abbott, Bayer, Brooke Bond, Cadbury, 
Chloride India, Ciba-Geigy, C P Tool, 
Firestone, GKW Screws Division, Hoechst, 
May & Baker, Metal Box, Parke-Davis, 
Philips, Sandvik Asia, and Wimco. In the 
70s there were lockouts in: C A F I (ICI), Col-
gate, Firestone, I C I M (International Com-
puters), Pfizer, Siemens, Chemco (Union 
Carbide). In Hoechst and Siemens the 
lockouts were directed against only one sec-
tion of the plant and reflected management's 
response to an attempted entry by Samant 
when most workers were still supporters of 
the employees' union. Of the 22 companies 
mentioned, 15 are UK or American-
controlled.) 
Table 11 studies the distribution of the 
major disputes between distinct groups of 
locations. As a measure of the frequency of 
one type of dispute relative to the other, the 
S/L ratio is clearly some indication of the 
kind of industrial relations which prevails, 
if only because it reflects the distribution of 
initiative between companies and their 
workforces. Between locations, the overall 
variation (of the ratio) runs from a max-
imum of 2.2 on the Thane-Belapur Road, 
i e, here workers have initiated major con-
flicts at least twice as frequently as their 
employers, to 0.64 in the purely rural loca-
tions and 0.5 in Thane proper (which is an 
amorphous grouping of distinct smaller 
locations with an average assortment of 
three to four major plants). Thus despite a 
certain proximity and administrative unifica-
tion, Thane-Belapur and Thane establish-
ments behave very differently. Apart from 
the purely physical characteristics of the area 
(the juxtaposition of plants for an unbroken 
stretch of almost 30 km and the purely large-
scale industrial nature of the area), the com-
panies which run plants on the Thane-
Belapur Road are more homogeneous in 
their industrial, technological and union 
characteristics. (In spite of this, however, 
union attempts to form a stable 'area com-
mittee' have always failed.) Within Greater 
Bombay, the concentration from Mulund to 
Ghatkopar, along the LBS Marg, shows an 
S/L ratio of the advanced (or Thane-
Belapur) type—22 [major] strikes to 11 
lockouts, i e, a hard conflict ratio of exactly 
2. The less cohesive/more isolated, and 
indeed more backward, locations reverse the 
pattern of initiatives- In these areas the hard 
conflicts are led by employers: beyond the 
cut-off point of two months, lockouts are 
more common than strikes; here is the 
spatial image of what, in temporal terms, 
happens only in the 80s. In somewhat dif-
ferent terms: by the 80s the behaviour of 
most employers begins to assume charac-
teristics already familiar from* the styles and 
experience of more remote, isolated loca-
tions. The geographical distribution of the 
'giant' lockouts—those which last for a 
whole 200 days at least—reflects this general 
difference even more sharply. In the sample 
there are 11 lockouts of this type: but Greater 
Bombay, Thane-Belapur and industrial con-
centrations like Pune and Nasik account for 
only four of these; Thane and the dispersed 
locations out in the countryside account for 
the remaining seven. With giant strikes, the 
pattern is the very opposite-—the distribu-
tion by areas contraposes 11 of these in 
Bombay and Thane-Belapur to just two 
elsewhere. 
Major strikes are not in fact a feature 
of those locations which are a pure expres-
sion of 'dispersed rural' characteristics 
(i e Shahad, Kalyan, Ambarnath and plants 
in the distant countryside). The seven 'major 
strikes' shown against this locational 
category are all from two specific locations 
within it: Tarapur and Taloja. If these loca-
tions were reassigned to some other 
category, then the purely rural type of loca-
tion would be able to show no major con-
flicts where workers took the lead by strik-
ing; all of the really hard conflict in these 
areas would be due to employers! 
The bottom half of Table 11 explores these 
area differences in terms of conflict dura-
tions. One result is especially impressive 
here: strike durations (i e, major strike 
durations) decline almost mathematically as 
industrial concentration decreases. We can 
call this 'the law of the progressive collapse 
Note. 'Settling time' is defined as the time elapsing between the date of submission of the charter and the date of final settlement. For each 
establishment Or company a single settling time has been used, viz, the specific time it took to reach the settlement which, for that com-
pany, happened to be operative in the middle of 1985 when the calculations'were made. * indicates cases where the conflict intensity level 
is largely determined by partial (Siemens) or departmental (Hoechst) conflicts rather than disputes involving the whole plant. 
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of strike durations in direct proportion to 
the diminishing influence of industrial 
masstfication'. Thus/ Greater Bombay has 
the longest strikes overall, and the two 
'dispersed rural' locations which have any 
strikes at all (Tarapur, Taloja), the shortest 
strikes overall. The term 'overall' indicates 
that this pattern holds when we average bet-
ween sectors; in fact there is a difference 
between Indian and foreign establishments, 
and the l aw ' applies only to the Indian-
controlled establishments; in foreign com-
panies it is the rural locations which have 
the longest (major) strikes. What all this 
implies is that there is a substantial dif-
ference in average strike length between the 
two types of establishments but a difference 
which is totally reversed between locations 
and types of locations. Thus in the advanced 
locations (Bombay, Thane-Belapur) emplo-
yees in foreign companies call off their 
(major) strikes at least three weeks before 
their Indian counterparts; but in locations 
which have rural characteristics and where 
workforces are largely (but not entirely) 
recruited from the local countryside (this 
time not only the dispersed rural locations 
but also those which are concentrated but 
rural, i e, 'semi-rural centres' such as Pune 
and Nasik) it is the foreign companies which 
seem to take the longest strikes. What seems 
to be happening is as follows: durations are 
being determined by two sorts of factors or 
types of influence—in Bombay and Thane-
Belapur (advanced locations) the primary in-
fluence is management's willingness to set-
tle (its 'propensity to negotiate') because the 
foreign company managements are more 
willing to settle, here foreign strikes are 
generally called off sooner; in the other types 
of locations (semi-rural and dispersed rural), 
the primary influence is the workers' 
capacity to sustain long strikes (not their 
determination to do so; why should this be 
any less in the Indian plants in these areas 
and not the company's willingness to settle, 
since it is hard to believe that foreign com-
panies which operate here are actually less 
inclined to settle than their local Indian 
counterparts); and this implies that 
workforces in the foreign plants in these 
areas are relatively less easily beaten into 
submission than the employees of Indian 
companies. 
One reason for this difference in 
employees' capacity to sustain long strike ac-
tions in the non-metropolitan locations 
could very well be that in these areas the 
managements who run Indian-controlled 
companies have fewer qualms about the kind 
of strategies they use to force a return to 
work. Again, the decisive variable is the sort 
of industrial relations system which tends to 
control relationships in a given location. 
The only aspect of the IR system which 
is considered here is conflict behaviour. In 
other words, this paper says nothing about 
two other aspects, viz, deployment practices 
or the ways in which managements utilise 
labour, and bargaining practices, or the ways 
in which they handle employees' demands 
or try to enforce their own. We have also 
seen that the use of lockouts has become an 
absolutely decisive feature of the conflict 
behaviour of large groups of employers in 
the Bombay area. When lockouts are includ-
ed in our picture of geographical differences 
in the distribution of major conflicts, the 
results are as follows: variations in the 
lockout/strike duration differential, which 
measured the tenacity and aggressiveness of 
one group relative to the other, reflect the 
influence of location as well as company. 
Case A: workers are more tenacious than 
employers = an 1/sdd less than 1—this is 
the case for Indian firms in Greater Bombay, 
foreign firms in Greater Bombay, and 
foreign firms in semi-rural centres like Pune 
and Nasik. Case B: the strikes companies 
take collapse or are called of f in less than 
half the time these companies force their 
employees to stay out when they declare 
lockouts = an 1/sdd greater than 2—this is 
the case with Indian firms in the dispersed 
rural locations, and almost the case with 
foreign plants in these locations. 
Table II begins to allow us to build a 
geography of the IR system, or an 
'industrial relations geography', i e, to deter-
mine where the breaks lie between the more 
advanced and more backward sectors; and 
to define the content of these terms in a 
more precise way. Advanced areas are 
chacterised by a low 1/sdd (in the pure 
case, less than 1), and by the fact that the 
lockouts of Indian companies are con-
siderably shorter than the same type of 
lockout elsewhere Greater Bombay is the 
pure case of a location of this kind, followed 
by Pune, Nasik, etc, (the semi-rural centres). 
The IR culture of rural industrialisation, on 
the contrary, throws up conflict patterns 
dominated by employer aggressiveness. Its 
most striking characteristic is the greater 
frequency and longer durations of lockouts. 
Finally, in terms of the internal geographical 
distribution of Indian/foreign plants, the 
areas just characterised as 'advanced' show 
no specific predominance of firms of one 
type or the other, but there are significant dif-
ferences in Thane-Belapur (many more 
foreign plants) and in Thane and the dispers-
ed locations (more Indian plants, especially 
in the latter). The results for Thane-Belapur 
are anomalous (the best S/L ratio but an 
l/sdd greater than I, with the longest Indian 
lockouts in the sample) but in fact perfectly 
explicable on the hypothesis that the IR 
culture of the road is sharply polarised in 
at least two ways—first in the sense of a 
sharp contrast between local plants which 
have had almost no conflict throughout their 
history (Roussel, Polyolefins, Searle, Indo-
Pharma, Rallis Pesticides) and those which 
have had at least one major conflict (Pfizer, 
Philips, Richardson Hindustan, Bharat 
Bijtee) or even several (Mukand, Indal, 
United Carbon); secondly, in the sense that 
among plants which do show some level of 
conflict, both groups, employers and 
employees, display all the characteristics of 
strong militancy—employees by their ob-
vious willingness to launch protracted strikes 
when they are forced to do so, i e, see 
themselves as having no option (thus there 
are 14 sample establishments from the 
Thane-Belapur Road and 11 major strikes; 
contrast this with Thana, which has 14 sam-
ple establishments but only five major 
strikes), and employers, by the tenacity of 
some of their lockouts (though here the pat-
tern is largely influenced by the experience 
of United Carbon, a lockout of 362 days in 
1978-79, and Mukand). 
The conflicts which paralysed production 
at Mukand's Kalwa plant for a large part of 
1984 are a classic illustration of the 
ruthlessness with which some business 
groups in India handle their labour relations. 
The main features are described below, but 
two aspects should be emphasised: Mukand 
management broke the strike and got legal 
backing for its action; not only that, 
however: management broke the union as 
well and could actually promote a 'company 
union' in the classic American sense of a 
union more or less controlled by manage-
ment. But 'company unions' in this sense are 
Note: 'Conflict groups' are sets of 25 in the ranking of companies by conflict intensity. 'Average 
time to settle', in months; [ ] indicates the maximum time it took for the companies in 
a given conflict group to reach a settlement; starting with the high group, the maximum 
settling times given are those for Amar Dye-Chem, Duphar, Pfizer, CAFI and 
Boehringer-Knoll. 
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rare in the Bombay area and should in any 
case never be confused with the more general 
type which calls i tself "employees' 
unionism". 
Tables 12 and 13 are about the possible 
relationships between conflict and types of 
unionism. In terms of the general form of 
union structure which prevails in most 
manufacturing plants in Bombay area, the 
'managing committee' of the union is the 
chief body, at establishment level, which 
handles the affairs of the union. In practice, 
most of the work tends to be done by a 
smaller group of office-bearers who, as the 
more active element within the union, would 
also form the nucleus of the committee 
which negotiates ('negotiating committee'), 
if not the whole of i t . However, there are 
enormous differences between managing 
committees, not just in terms of the size of 
the committee but in terms of the extent to 
which they can be said to have an indepen-
dent existence as the leadership of the union. 
The key factor which determines the form 
and extent of this independence is the kind 
of relation which the committee has to out-
siders or 'professionals' who may be involv-
ed with the union in a mainly legal or legal 
as well as bargaining capacity. 'May be 
involved', because while it is standard prac-
tice to use the help of an outsider or out-
side union organisation, a committee is ob-
viously under no obligation to do so, and 
there are some committees which prefer 
not to have anything to do with outside 
leaderships. 
The extent to which a managing commit-
tee controls its own agreements, or its 
'bargaining autonomy', will determine how 
far its relationship to external advisers or 
outside leaderships leaves the committee 
with a large measure of self-determination 
or, on the contrary, tends to reduce the com-
mittee to a purely subaltern existence. In a 
purely formal sense, there are three possi-
bilities here: (A) a committee decides to have 
no substantive relationship with outside 
leaderships (beyond seeking occasional legal 
advice, and not necessarily from the same 
legal adviser); this is the case with some 
employees' unions, but not always for the 
same reasons; some of these committees may 
feel they are sufficiently competent to han-
dle their own affairs and may rely on a legal 
adviser 'mainly for drafting' (as one such 
committee put it); others, however, may have 
no real choice in the matter, because 
management is completely opposed to hav-
ing any dealings with outsiders or 'profes-
sionals' and forces the committee into a 
position of relative isolation (some com-
panies controlled by the Tatas reflect features 
of this model). (B) A committee works in 
close co-operation with a legal adviser or 
outside trade union, but continues to call 
itself an "employees' union", and in that 
sense at least, formally retains its in-
dependence: however, the de facto relation-
ship between the committee and its outsider 
will depend on numerous factors such as the 
personal qualities and individual capacities 
of the people who run the committee, the 
outsider's general style of leadership, who 
management deals with, etc. (These are the 
unions which are called 'B-type' in Table 19; 
here 'B' has the general sense of 'indeter-
minacy' associated wi th the truth-value I in 
3-valued logic) (C) The committee affiliates 
its membership to an outside union, tradi-
tionally one of the central TUs present in 
most parts of the country; in this case, it is 
the name of this larger, outside organisation 
which appears on the agreement. The term 
external unions covers situations of this type. 
Tables 12 and 13 simplify this picture by 
reducing a 3-valued structure to the bipolari-
ty of employees' unions vs external unions. 
Here the "employees' unions" include B-type 
unions, namely, those which call themselves 
employees' unions but also depend on out-
side union advice or leadership and so may 
not have complete control over their own 
agreements. In terms of the (pattern of 
unionism between groups of firms, it seems 
that external unions are the leading type of 
unionism in Indian-controlled companies, 
where almost 75 per cent of unions involved 
in conflict have been of this form; on the 
other hand, the foreign sector is more 
equally divided between employees' unions 
and external unions, with a certain tendency 
for employees' unions to be the more com-
mon type. In this respect at least, the joint 
venture plants resemble foreign-controlled 
plants, since they also show a certain 
predominance of internal unions. 
Thus employees' unions are rather more 
closely associated with foreign companies. 
However, there is no significant difference 
between the two types of unions in terms of 
their involvement in industrial conflict. If 
we restrict ourselves to the major conflicts, 
then 44.8 per cent of disputes in which 
employees' unions are involved are lockouts, 
while 43.9 per cent of the external unions' 
disputes are lockouts. This does not support 
the possible hypothesis that local manage-
ments favour employees' unions and direct 
their lockouts mainly against the external 
unions. Indeed, some of the strongest op-
position, recently, has been to a particular 
form of employees' unionism which 
(managements now realise) is the least trac-
table type of union structure any company 
is likely to face, namely, the federations 
which organise most or all plants of a com-
pany throughout the country. Despite the 
morphological characteristics which 
distinguish them from the general mass of 
employees' unionism, the company federa-
tions are far closer to the internal unions 
than to the external ones, because, like the 
employees' unions, they take as their 
framework the legal or de facto boundaries 
of a company or group of companies. 
Our results also show that being an 
employees' union makes no difference to (he 
union's participation in major conflicts— 
the proportion of employees' unions involv-
ed in disputes lasting more than 60 days (37.2 
per cent) is almost exactly equal to the pro-
portion of employees' unions in the sample 
as a whole (37.1 per cent). If the former 
(i e, their share of all unions involved in 
major conflicts) were significantly below the 
latter (i e, their overall representation in the 
sample), it would be possible to claim that 
employees' unions are somehow averse to the 
more intense type of conflict; but this is not 
so. And this suggests that the more general 
sort of claim made by the Shramik in Pune 
that internal unions are a deliberate device 
of foreign managements or big firms like 
Telco to ensure industrial peace (with its 
clear implication that employees' unions are 
more docile or that being an internal union 
is associated with negligible levels of con-
flict) is simply not true. It may very well be 
true that powerful managements like Telco 
(which is Tata-controlled) can succeed in 
dominating their internal unions where 
unions like the Shramik would pose more 
obvious internal resistance, but it is equally 
true that there is massive corruption among 
some external leaderships and that many 
local managements in fact prefer to deal with 
external leaderships, partly because they 
know much less about conditions in the 
plant or the company as a whole (and are 
also far less interested in acquiring such 
knowledge) and partly because they are open 
to corruption, 
Blue Star, Philips, Voltas, Crompton 
Greaves, Tomco are all examples of com-
panies where there has been considerable 
conflict with unions organised as company 
Note: 'Most conflict prone' is the top 10 per 
cent 
of each group. 
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federations and where breaking the federa-
tion or weakening its hold has been (at one 
time or another) the essential motivation 
behind management's strategy. But even the 
smaller scale or more isolated employees' 
unions, those which operate outside the 
framework of any active (company or 
industry) federation, have sometimes en-
countered strong management opposition. 
One of the best recent examples of this is 
the way in which management in the 
American-owned pharmaceutical company, 
Abbott Laboratories, used divisions within 
the workforce (between contract workers and 
permanent employees) to destabilise the 
employees' union. But in the Bombay phar-
maceutical companies the key factor behind 
much of the opposition to internal unions 
has been the fact that unions of this sort 
have made more conscious efforts (and suc-
cessful ones) to organise the 'medical reps' 
or field staff and posed a direct threat to the 
company's control over the work schedules 
and work loads of this absolutely decisive 
section of their labour force. 
On the other hand, what managements 
oppose (presumably anywhere) is not 
employees' unions or internal unions as 
such, but strong unions. Now the 'strength' 
of a wnion is not something purely objec-
tive, or something which can be decided by 
an objective test. How strong a union is, is, 
at least partly, a matter of judgment—based 
on experience—no doubt, but sufficiently 
ambiguous to allow managements to have 
conflicting assessments. A large part of the 
opposition to Samant (who could build what 
became, locally, the biggest external union) 
has been precisely of this type. 'Serial pro-
pagation' played a decisive role in shaping 
employer opposition to the expansion of 
Samant's unions in the late 70s (just as it 
did in the expansion itself) By the early 80s 
it had become dear, to some employers at 
least, that 'the Doctor' was more amenable 
to certain crucial management objectives 
than it was possible for them to see in a 
period of panic-stricken reactions. For 
example, when Crompton Greaves manage-
ment finally broke the hold of its federation, 
it put up no resistance whatever to signing 
the next agreement with Samant, By the 
early 80s it would have been true to say that 
Bombay employers no longer had a clear at-
titude to Samant. One militant has explained 
this evolution by the fact that by then suffi-
cient time had elapsed for both companies 
and workers to know what Samant's second 
settlements were like. 
At any rate, a great part of the more in-
tense conflict from the late 70s and early 80s 
represented outright employer opposition to 
dealing with the MGKU. This was especially 
true of whole groups of Indian employers— 
the people in control of companies like 
Premier Auto, Amar Dye-Chem, Mukand, 
Mafatlal Engineering, National Rayon 
(NRC), Carona Sahu, Calico Chemicals, in 
most of which Samant found himself fac-
ing massive lockouts which were intended to 
keep him out or to break his union, lb these 
employers it seemed to make no difference 
that at least one local management (Godrej) 
had defeated Samant by purely tactical 
means, some seven or eight years earlier, or 
that there were foreign companies like Bayer 
where management seemed to have no 
special problems with him. 
Table 14 is about the motivations behind 
major conflicts. A comparison with the 
earlier breakdown for all sample conflicts (see 
Table 8 and the comments) would show that 
pay issues, go-slows and union rivalries in-
crease their share of reported issues when 
only the longer disputes (i e, major conflicts) 
are taken into account. In fact, it is possi-
ble to make a stronger statement: since the 
sort of go-slows that actually figure in the 
strike registers as reasons for a dispute (viz, 
lockout) are go-slows which workers have 
probably sustained for several weeks, and go-
slows of this protracted type are generally 
organised to support pay claims which the 
company is reluctant to discuss (a charter is 
presented but no discussion occurs for 
months, or a charter has been pending for 
several years, etc), a lot of the hard conflict 
(probably over 50 per cent) is dominated by 
demands on pay. And this implies that it is 
duration and not frequency (of conflicts) 
which forms the true index of the intensity 
of workers' and managements') feelings 
about pay. It was pointed out earlier that 
in terms of frequency alone, conflicts on 
non-pay issues, in particular disputes involv-
ing direct clashes with managerial authority, 
are as widespread and common in Bombay 
area companies as conflicts on pay. 
In Table 15 and subsequent tables, 'con-
flict intensity' has been defined in terms of 
(the total number of) days of conflict rather 
than man-days lost, because it seems to us 
that size of establishment has no bearing on 
the intensity of conflict. It may be useful for 
employers or the state to know how strikes 
have affected production and the 'man-days 
lost' index may be some index of this, but 
there is no obvious reason why the study of 
strikes should assign any theoretical impor-
tance to a variable of this son, when it has 
none. Our measure of the intensity of con-
flict consciously disregards the fact that in 
two disputes of the same duration, the pro-
duction losses due to one may be far greater 
than those entailed by the other. Workforces 
which have been involved in conflict for 
precisely the same number of days (or weeks 
or months) in the plant's history are regarded 
as being at the same level of conflict inten-
sity', regardless of their size. Thus the fre-
quency and duration of conflicts are the only 
variables that count in defining intensity. 
This conception of conflict intensity lacks 
precision in one respect: it fails to take into 
account the fact that some plants are older 
than others, or that plants were commission-
ed at different stages, or even in quite dif-
ferent decades. Thus something like 'number 
of days of conflict per year of the plant's 
existence' might have been a more precise 
index. However, overall restriction to a 
sample period eliminates a large part of the 
chronological diversity which is potentially 
involved here. For example, in older plants 
like Hindustan Lever, Firestone, Metal Box, 
and so on, one simply disregards all conflicts 
which occurred before the early 50s, 
In Table 18 the average intensity level per 
company works out to just over 218 days. 
This means that on average sample com-
panies have been involved in that many days 
of conflict (strike or lockout) during the 
sample period. However, companies may 
have more than one establishment, and there 
is no obvious reason why the different 
establishments grouped under the same 
company may not have rather different 
experiences of conflict. The intensity level 
per establishment works out to just over 152 
days; that is to say, the average establishment 
has been involved in one or other form of 
conflict for a total period of 5 months in the 
course of its life-span within the sample 
period. 
The actual distribution of this average is 
the essential issue behind a study of the IR 
system. There is a substantial difference in 
intensity between the Indian and foreign-
controlled groups, with an average of 180 
days of conflict (per establishment) in the 
Indian sector against 110 days of conflict in 
the foreign sector. Thus the 'total period of 
five months' mentioned in the previous 
paragraph averages between six months in 
the Indian sector and just over 3½ months 
in the foreign sector Thus, when we study 
a concrete system of labour relations in a 
country like India, grouping together and 
averaging between Indian and foreign-
controlled plants is the first sort of abstrac-
tion involved. 
Note-, 'Intensity level' is defined as the total days (including hours) of conflict reported for com-
panies or their constituent establishments over the sample period. The definition purposely 
abstracts from size of establishment, for the reasons stated in the text. 
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However, in both groups of companies or 
establishments there is a considerable con-
centration of conflict, the top 10 per cent of 
companies in each group accounting for up 
to 32.9 per cent (Indian) and 31.6 per cent 
(foreign) of the total conflict in that group 
and the single most conflict-prone company 
in each sector (Premier Auto among Indian 
companies, Hindustan Lever among the 
foreign establishments) generating as much 
as 7 per cent. Thus even the general type of 
control over plants (Indian/foreign is not 
sufficient to account for the distribution of 
conflict. 
At the other (less conflict-prone) end of 
the scale, situations of low conflict could in-
dicate either (a) stable industrial relations, or 
(b) management domination over the union. 
This distinction, subtle but crucial, is less 
difficult to establish in practice than through 
any precise theoretical criterion. In other 
words, with the appropriate background 
knowledge it is easier to know which plants 
actually fall under one category or the other 
than to be able to say why that is so. But 
settling time provides one obvious index of 
the extent of management domination, of 
the degree to which management determines 
or controls the bargaining process. 
Table 15 does seem to indicate an overall 
association between settling time (propen-
sity to negotiate) and conflict intensity. The 
distribution of companies by conflict levels 
and degrees of resistance to settling implies 
two industrial relations systems potentially 
(high conflict with long settling times, and, 
low conflict with rapid settlements). For the 
companies actually listed in the table, the 
'modd' : Types of management behaviour: 
(a) Rapid settlements forced on the union, 
e g, Godrej (settling time in months - 4.25) 
and Telco (2.85), both cases of low conflict, 
signifying a high degree of employer 
domination over the union. But this need not 
imply that in these companies management 
strategies are identical or in any way similar. 
For example, recruitment policies have been 
decisive in Godrej's general stability, whereas 
a lot of fairly sophisticated management 
thinking has gone into grade structuring and 
use of labour in Telco's Pune plants. At any 
rate, in these companies the strategies have 
been very different, (b) More or less average 
settling time -( in Bombay's bargaining 
system, this works out to just over 12 
months) with low conflict—these are the 
most likely cases of stable industrial rela-
tions, e g, MSD before the Tatas took over 
(11.75), Mahindra Auto (8.25), Burroughs 
Wellcome (9.25), none of which have had 
any serious conflict, (c) More or less average 
settling time with high (frequent or persis-
tent) conflict—the most probable cases of 
hard bargaining, e g, Philips at the Kalwa 
plant (15.8), Blue Star (16.75) or Hindustan 
Lever (20.6), all of which have had some 
massive conflicts or at least been through 
some extremely militant agitations, (d) 
Strong resistance to settling (from manage-
ment's side), e g, Pfizer (38.8), Tomco 
(31.55), Bharat Petroleum or BPCL for 
short, government-controlled since the early 
70s (27.35), Indal (24.55) and Amar Dye 
Chem (35.0). In this group it is possible to 
distinguish two types of motivation: 
(i) strong resistance on pay—the purest 
example of this is BPCL, whose public sec-
tor management simply refused to settle un-
til the unions accepted the Rs 1.30 DA for-
mula wWch the central government has been 
able to enforce in most undertakings under 
its control; (ii) opposition to recognising or 
dealing with the union, as in Amar Dye-
Chem where Samant encountered terrific 
resistance from the company until it was 
finally forced to accept him. Conflicts in 
Tomco and Indal are cases where both 
motives were involved, in one case against 
a federation which wanted the charter 
discussed for all Tomco establishments 
throughout the country, in the other against 
Samant (whom the Mahindras are complete-
ly opposed to). 
Table 15 is further proof that foreign firms 
are not conflict-free enclaves: Philips, San-
doz, Pfizer, Wyeth Laboratories, Ciba-Geigy 
and Hindustan Lever are all foreign-
controlled, but all of them have settling 
times exceeding 15 months, and ranging up 
to almost 39 months, as well as high rates 
of conflict intensity (a total of at least 200 
days of conflict, in general much more than 
that). In the opposite model—that is, low 
conflict (less than 100 days) and rapid 
settlements— of 18 firms which register set-
tling times of less than one year, at least ten 
are foreign-controlled. In other words, 
among operations which art foreign-
con t ml led (here is a sharp differentiation of 
management characteristics and rates of 
conflict. 
A final observation: two sets of factors 
interact in the results in Table 19, which 
describes the pattern of conflict for a series 
of the most important local unions or types 
of unions. These are (a) management op-
position, which tends to reflect the im-
mediate bargaining situation, and (b) the 
union's bargaining strategy. Lockouts are an 
obvious means by which managements ex-
press or enforce their opposition, to a 
specific union (e g, Samant's) or type of 
union (e g, those led from the outside), or 
finally to the union in some particular situa-
tion (e g, to get the union to accept demands 
on productivity, as in the Philips lockout of 
1981, or to resist a demand for permanen-
cy, which was the reason why Pfizer was 
locked out in 1977). Thus, the strength of 
management's opposition to the union (in 
any of the senses outlined) is measurable in 
at least two ways: (i) by considering the fre-
quency of lockouts in a union's experience 
with conflict, (it) by taking into account the 
(average) duration of lockouts inflicted on 
particular unions. On the other hand, the 
Note: The figures in this table are no indication of the actual distribution of conflicts between the unions mentioned; they are based on the 
disputes reported for the sample companies; unions which art found mainly among workforces in the smaller firms almost certainly have 
higher conflict rates than those shown in this table 'Sample conflicts' refers to disputes with a duration of 3 days +. The unions/types 
of unions mentioned accounted for some 75 per cent of all sample conflicts of this duration(3 days + )'B-type' unions are employees' 
unions which retain an outsider (or professional) in some significant capacity; they are 'internal' but not purely so 'Co federations' in-
eludes unions which are clearly known to be purely internal (in contrast to B-type) and which, for an important group of companies (but 
not all) cover all or most establishments of the company through a federation. 
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By a process of deduction, this general 
schema can be translated into the following 
sort of strategy which unions pursue with 
respect to collective bargaining emerges from 
the (far from standardised) ways in which 
they handle their options: faced with 
management resistance (normally to 
demands) the union can opt for (a) conflict 
(some form of confrontation) as opposed to 
discussion, or at least to repeated attempts 
to get management to discuss, (b) particular 
forms of confrontation (repeated internal 
disruption rather than a strike) and (c), if 
it does decide to strike, particular ways of 
using strike action (prolonged strikes which 
the union may expect workers to sustain for 
over a year, cf Samant's handling of the 
Bombay textile strike early in the eighties; 
alternatively, short departmental stoppages 
which may embody considerable planning). 
This way of analysing conflict patterns 
makes it possible to use the experience of 
conflict (the union's, in this case) to group 
unions into more general but well-defined 
'styles*. In Table 19 four models arc 
discernible: 
(1) The ACW (Association of Chemical 
Workers, INTUC-related) and BKS (Bharatiya 
Kamgar Sena, Shiv Sena-controlled) both 
encounter a high proportion of lockouts (33 
per cent of all conflicts they have been in-
volved in), the lockouts themselves are fairly 
protracted (above or close to the extremely 
high average durations of the early eighties), 
but these unions also register the lowest 
strike frequencies, which implies that they 
are certainly averse to strike action. 
(2) CITU (CPI(M)-controlled) and B-type 
unions, that is, employees' unions led by an 
outsider (in most cases, their legal adviser) 
have low lockout proportions as well as the 
lowest 1/sdd ratios, i e, in comparative 
terms, encounter less aggressiveness from 
employers; thus in Bombay at least, there is 
no evidence to support the notion that 
employers are especially hostile to a union 
controlled by a party which calls itself 
Marxist; the logic which governs Bombay 
labour relations is an industrial relations 
logic, not an obviously political one. The 
SSS (Sarva Shrarnik Sangh, connected with 
the Lai Nishan Party, also leftwing) and the 
B l U (Bombay Labour Union, strong in the 
sixties when it was led by George Fernandes 
for the socialists) reflect the general 
characteristics of this 'left wing' model, but 
with clear signs of having encountered more 
opposition from employers. The BLU's 
average strike duration (12 days, by far the 
lowest for Bombay) almost certainly ex-
presses the general style of conflict which 
characterised BLU plants in the period when 
Fernandes led Bombay unionism: rapid con-
frontations involving department stoppages 
over day-to-day deployment, for example, in 
Firestone throughout the early sixties. 
(3) Samant, who emerged as the single 
most important union leader of the late 
seventies and early eighties, but with a style 
of bargaining rooted more in quasi-political 
charisma than in any conscious control of 
strategy; his unions, the AEW (Association 
of Engineering Workers) and the M G K U 
(Maharashtra General Kamgar Union) 
display at pattern of conflict intermediate 
between the two just described. Samant's 
unions encountered more opposition from 
employers than any other unions—not only 
a high rate of lockouts (33 per cent, like the 
ACW and BKS) but three-quarters of them 
(27 out of 36) lasting generally well over 
three months. Of the giant conflicts in the 
sample (200 days+), the majority involve 
Samant. On the other hand, Samant reacted 
to employer opposition both by calling 
strikes more frequently than most unions 
(except for those described in (4) below) and 
by attempting to sustain strikes for longer 
periods—durations which could actually 
cease to have any instrumental significance, 
as management slowly resumed production 
with the en masse recruitment of strike-
breakers (cf the Mukand steel plant at Kalwa 
or the Bombay mills) and a hard core was 
forced to hold out indefinitely. So the model 
here is: strong employer opposition (not 
necessarily permanent, however) matched by 
a conscious, overtly propagandist use of the 
strike as a means of increasing support (for 
Samant) rather than achieving settlement 
(for workers). 
(4) The model defined by the internal 
unions—employees' unions in the pure sense 
and company federations based on them; 
after Samant, most of the hard conflict (60 
days+) has centred on unions of this type— 
a surprising and significant result which 
completely discredits the idea that internal 
unions are simply submissive management 
toots, 'company unions' in the American 
sense, lacking any real autonomy and en-
countering no opposition. On the contrary, 
employees' unions/federations account for 
19 per cent of major strikes (compare 
Samant's 22 per cent) and 22 per cent of 
major lockouts—a level of employer opposi-
tion halfway between Samant (40 per cent) 
and the rest. On the other hand, the strike 
behaviour of this group of unions resembles 
the more perfectly rational durations of 
(2) as opposed to the long but often inef-
fectual conflicts launched by Samant. 
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